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ABSTRACT
During the past century, conceptualizing mental disorders has fluctuated between 
biomedical and psychosocial models of psychopathology. By theorizing the 
nature of psychopathology, the social constructivist and essentialist perspectives 
each explain these fluctuations in understanding mental disorders. According to 
the social constructivist perspective, mental disorders are abstract ideas, which are 
defined by the sociocultural values of the time. Conversely, the essentialist 
perspective maintains that mental disorders are discrete, naturally occurring 
entities with a biological basis. Extant research suggests that essentialist beliefs 
may underlie lay conceptions of mental disorders (Haslam & Ernst, 2005). The 
present study investigated how lay preconceived notions about mental disorders 
influenced inferences about the nature and treatment of various mental disorders. 
394 undergraduates read diagnostic vignettes for mental disorders and reported 
their beliefs on dimensions of essentialism, global functioning, and treatment. In 
addition, participants reported the degree to which they intuitively adhered to a 
biomedical or psychosocial model of mental disorders. Results indicated that 
laypeople conceptualize mental disorders into three broad clusters. Laypeople 
believed that Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal 
Personality Disorder were biologically-oriented and categorical in nature. On the 
other hand, laypeople believed that Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder were influenced by psychosocial factors and that 
they were dimensional in nature. Interestingly, laypeople conceptualized Major 
Depressive Disorder and Dysthymic Disorder as having both a biological and 
psychosocial basis. Moreover, results indicated that laypeople who adhere to a 
biomedical model, psychosocial model, or biomedical-psychosocial dialectic 
model of mental disorders conceptualize clusters of mental disorders differently. 
Findings suggest that attribution models of mental disorders frame laypeople’s 
beliefs and intuitions about mental disorders.
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Folk Conceptions of Mental Disorders 
“Men are so necessarily mad, that not to be mad would amount to another form
o f madness. ” ~ Blaise Pascal 
What is a mental disorder? Although the definition of psychopathology 
has fluctuated through the centuries (for review, see Alexander & Selesnick,
1995), its definition has tried to identify the line which divides normal human 
behavior from the psychological dysfunction of mental disorders. The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR, 2000) currently 
defines mental disorders as “clinically significant behavioral or psychological 
syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with 
present distress or disability or with a significantly increased risk of suffering 
death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom” (p. xxxi). Unfortunately, 
the DSM-IV-TR definition of mental disorders does not pinpoint exactly what a 
mental disorder is. After all, how does one distinguish “clinically significant 
behavior” from “not clinically significant” behavior? Moreover, is the 
determination of “clinically significant behavior” reserved exclusively for 
psychiatrists and other mental health care professionals?
Indeed, the DSM-IV-TR definition of mental disorders is ambiguous, and 
as a result, it fails to label the defining properties of mental disorders. Regardless, 
this definition contains the two core components of prototypical definitions of 
mental disorders: scientific and value judgments. According to the theory of 
harmful dysfunction for conceptualizing mental disorders, mental disorder
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attributions require both a scientific judgment that there exists a failure of 
designed function and a value judgment that design failure harms the individual 
(Wakefield, 1992, 1999). In a two-pronged manner, Wakefield’s (1992, 1999) 
definition of mental disorders recognizes that biological criteria are essential 
components of defining mental disorders. That is, mental disorders arise from a 
biological “failure,” which is identified and evaluated according to scientific 
judgment. Secondly, Wakefield’s (1992, 1999) definition concedes that 
sociocultural criteria are likewise an important component of defining mental 
disorders. Without the value judgment of assaying mental disorder-induced 
“harmful” outcomes for the individual, mental disorders would not exist. Hence, 
the definition of mental disorders must simultaneously address universal 
biological criteria and relative sociocultural criteria.
From prehistoric times to the modem era, the definition, latent features, 
and names of mental disorders have fluctuated. These changes in the historical 
conceptions of mental disorders can be attributed to evolving understanding of the 
biological functioning of humans and dynamic sociocultural trends. Cumulatively, 
the advancement of medicine and changing cultural values regarding 
psychopathology have conceded shifts in thinking about mental disorders. Before 
the modem era of science in the late 19 century, the conception of mental 
disorders was relatively stable and widely held, for it fluctuated over spans of 
centuries. However, the last 150 years of psychiatry has been demarcated by 
radical transitions in the conception of mental disorders which occurred in the
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span of decades. Moreover, mental health professionals embroiled in a debate on 
the nature of psychopathology have often espoused widely divergent views on 
mental disorders. To illustrate these changing trends in modem psychiatric 
thought, we will provide a brief survey of historical conceptions of mental 
disorders.
Historical Conceptions o f  Mental Disorders
Medical Model o f  the Modern Era. During the late 19 century, 
psychiatry became a branch of medicine and mental disorders were 
conceptualized as biologically-based diseases (for review, see Alexander & 
Selesnick, 1995; Horwitz, 2002). The medical model for understanding mental 
disorders was developed by psychiatrist Emil Kaepelin, the founder of modem 
scientific psychiatry. Kraepelin believed that all mental disorders were biological 
disturbances with the brain. The behavior, cognitions, and affect of an individual 
with mental illness were merely symptoms of this brain-based disease. From this 
medical model, Kraepelin observed the “symptoms” of mental disorders to 
classify and diagnose various brain-based diseases (i.e., mental disorders), which 
parallels physicians observing the physiological symptoms of a patient to 
diagnose a disease. Through this scientific system of observation of symptoms 
and diagnosis, Kraepelin was able to differentiate manic depression from 
dementia praecox (i.e., schizophrenia). The realm of psychiatry was still limited 
to select cases of severe psychosis, and these individuals were institutionalized in 
asylums. For instance, Kraepelin limited his diagnostic system to dementia
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praecox, manic depression, and severe depression. People with everyday 
problems sought clergical guidance, and they were not considered to have a 
mental disorder.
Psychoanalytic Model Throughout the early to mid twentieth century, 
psychoanalytic model of mental disorders reigned over psychiatry (for review, see 
Alexander & Selesnick, 1995; Horwitz, 2002; Valenstein, 1998). “In 1950, it was 
rare that someone not committed to psychoanalytic theory would head a major 
psychiatry department” (Valenstein, 1998, p. 1). Instead of conceptualizing 
mental disorders as a brain-based disease, psychiatry interpreted mental disorders 
according to Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. Mental disorders were 
attributed to early childhood experiences. In particular, one’s relationship with 
one’s mother was emphasized, and the quality of that relationship strongly 
influenced the presence of mental illness later in life. Moreover, mental disorders 
were caused by repression, sexual desires, fixations, or one’s libido. In addition, 
the legacy of Freud demystified and humanized mental disorders. Mental 
disorders were no longer limited to the madmen warehoused in Bedlam (Bethlem 
Royal Hospital in London). Mental disorders now extended to all people coping 
with everyday problems of living. As such, treatment for mental disorders 
became a process of self exploration. Intellectuals, artists, bohemians, teachers, 
health professionals, and those that frequented museums or concerts comprised 
the clientele base of psychoanalytic psychiatry. These individuals often were
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naturally inclined toward introspection and a strong individual identity and were 
marginalized by mainstream society.
Antipsychiatry & Deinstitutionalization. From 1950 to 1970, the history 
psychiatry was punctuated by antipsychiatry and deinstitutionalization (for review, 
see Alexander & Selesnick, 1995; Horwitz, 2002; Valenstein, 1998). These two 
events radically shifted the conception of mental disorders by countering the 
psychoanalytic model and restoring the medical model. Antipsychiatric writings, 
such as Szasz’s (1960) The Myth o f Mental Illness, challenged the very existence 
of mental disorders. Antipsychiatry, although a short-lived movement, had 
lasting repercussions for psychiatry. It exposed that yesterday’s socially deviant 
behavior could become today’s mental disorder.
Occurring simultaneously with the antipsychiatry movement, 
advancements in psychopharmaceuticals revolutionized the treatment of mental 
disorders. Compared to psychotherapy, pharmacotherapy was immediately 
effective and less time consuming. As a result, psychiatrists began using 
pharmacotherapy to treat patients at mental hospitals. Due to the efficacy of 
pharmacotherapy, thousands of mentally ill individuals were deinstitutionalized, 
or released from mental hospitals. The dramatic impact of pharmacotherapy on 
psychiatry is most evident between 1950 and 1970. In 1950, it was considered 
unethical to conduct schizophrenia research without psychotherapy, yet by 1970, 
it was considered unethical to conduct this research without pharmacotherapy 
(Gunderson, 1977).
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Biomedical Model Since antipsychiatry and deinstitutionalization, the 
conception of mental disorders has returned to the neo-Kraepelin biomedical 
model (for review, see Alexander & Selesnick, 1995; Horwitz, 2002). Modem 
psychiatry has shifted from blaming the mother for mental disorders to blaming 
the brain (Valenstein, 1998). According to the biomedical model, people with 
mental disorders “suffer from a sick or broken brain, not from weak will, laziness, 
bad character, or bad upbringing” (Andreasen, 1984, p.8). For many health care 
professionals, mental disorders are considered to be brain-based, biological 
dysfunctions and chemical imbalances, which result in disturbances in cognition, 
affect, and behavior. Like physiological diseases, mental disorders are diagnosed 
by a medical professional observing a pattern of symptoms and prognosticated 
with psychopharmaceuticals. Despite the similarities, the medical model of 
Kraepelin’s era and the current biomedical model differ in two important ways. 
For one, the current biomedical model posits that since mental disorders are brain- 
based dysfunctions, mental disorders can be treated and potentially reversed, or 
“cured,” with psychopharmaceuticals. Secondly, the current biomedical model 
extends mental disorders to problems of living, whereas Kraepelin’s medical 
model restricted mental disorders to select cases of severe psychosis.
Conclusion. This historical survey of the conception of mental disorders 
demonstrates that thinking about psychopathology has come full circle, from 
Kraepelin’s medical model to the Freudian psychoanalytic model to the neo- 
Kraepelin biomedical model.
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Conceptualizing Mental Disorders
These radical transformations in thinking about mental disorders illustrate 
broader sociocultural fluctuations in defining and conceptualizing mental 
disorders. Over the past century, defining mental disorders has swung between 
Wakefield’s (1992, 1999) two-pronged criteria. Specifically, defining mental 
disorders has oscillated between emphasizing scientific values with the 
biomedical model and emphasizing sociocultural values with the psychosocial 
model. This fluctuation reflects a transition between two perspectives of 
conceptualizing and understanding mental disorders -  social constructivism and 
essentialism.
According to the social constructivist perspective, mental disorders are 
abstract ideas that are socially constructed, instead of scientifically constructed 
(Maddux, Gosselin, & Winstead, 2005). Mental disorders are not universal and 
stable across time. In fact, social constructivism asserts that mental disorders are 
defined by the sociocultural values of the time. Accordingly, since the definitions 
of mental disorders fluctuate, psychopathology has a dimensional nature, in that 
people merely vary by the extent to which they express psychological phenomena, 
such as emotion, mood, intelligence, and behavior. The psychoanalytic model of 
mental disorders is closely analogous to the social constructivist perspective, for it 
redefined psychopathology in a unique manner that suited the philosophical
thclimate of the time. For instance, during the early 20 century, Freudian theory
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allowed for broadening the definition of mental disorders to include common 
problems of living.
Conversely, the essentialist perspective maintains that mental disorders are 
discrete, naturally occurring entities with a biological basis (Haslam, 2005; 
Rosenblum & Travis, 1996). In addition, mental disorders can be discovered and 
studied scientifically. As such, essentialism asserts that mental disorders have a 
biological essence, which makes them universal and immutable, or stable across 
historical epochs. According to this perspective, any fluctuation in thinking about 
psychopathology would be propelled by advancements in scientific understanding. 
The essentialist perspective asserts that mental disorders are biologically-oriented, 
discrete entities, and that their classification has a categorical nature. Not 
surprisingly, the biomedical model of mental disorders and the current diagnostic 
system of the DSM-IV-TR are closely analogous to the essentialist perspective.
Throughout the radical transformations in popular thought on 
psychopathology, mental health professionals have espoused the social 
constructivist and essentialist perspectives simultaneously. These divergent 
perspectives on the nature of psychopathology have historically have pitted the 
biological and psychosocial origins of mental disorders against each other. In its 
historical context, this debate is known as the “Nature versus Nurture” debate. 
Proponents of the “Nature” argument traditionally supported a model of genetic 
inheritence of mental disorders. On the other hand, proponents of the “Nurture”
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argument traditionally supported the importance of life experiences in the 
development of mental disorders.
Despite compelling empirical evidence for both “Nature” and “Nurture” 
arguments, the conflicting views on origin of mental disorders are, unfortunately, 
not merging into a grand synthesis of the two (Valenstein, 1998). Indeed, 
genetics can influence one’s interactions with the environment, just as interactions 
with the environment can influence genetic expression. Regardless of the 
interplay between genes and the environment, a multitude of factors, such as 
publishing opportunities, empirical methodology trends, funding for research 
grants, aggressive advertising from psychopharmaceutical companies, and third 
party supported treatment options for mental disorders, indicate that the 
biomedical model of mental disorders dominates current professional and public 
thinking about mental disorders (Luhrmann, 2000).
Lay Beliefs about Mental Disorders
Unlike mental health professionals, the general public is less likely to have 
been inculcated with the biomedical model of mental disorders from 
psychological training or from reading empirical studies and other psychological 
writings. Realistically, the public has probably received most of its information 
on the biomedical model of mental disorders from the advertising campaigns of 
mental disorder advocacy groups and psychopharmaceutical companies. 
Psychopharmaceutical companies are a multibillion dollar industry. Similar to all 
companies, their economic viability is dependent upon the retention of current
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clients and the recruitment of new clients. As a result, the marketing campaigns 
of psychopharmaceutical campaigns promote the biomedical model of mental 
disorders. By increasing public opinion that psychopharmaceuticals effectively 
treat mental disorders, the psychopharmaceutical companies, in effect, increase 
their clientele base and profit margin. Furthermore, in adherence with the 
biomedical model, psychopharmaceutical companies advertise that mental 
disorders are biologically-based, disease-like entities. For instance, Eli Lilly 
advertised for Prozac, which is a popular drug treatment for depression, “Like 
diabetes or arthritis, depression is a physical illness” (cited in, Valenstein, 1998, p. 
181). Hence, lay conceptions of mental disorders and their knowledge of the 
biomedical model of mental disorders are shaped by psychopharmaceutical 
companies.
Laypeople’s conceptions of mental disorders could resemble diluted 
reflections of professional views on mental disorders (Jorm, 2000). Conversely, 
laypeople could actively construct their own understandings of mental disorders 
based on broader sociocultural views (Haslam, 2005). Regardless of how 
laypeople conceptualize mental disorders, it is likely that current lay conceptions 
of mental disorders are, at least loosely, based on the biomedical model of mental 
disorders. According to Haslam (2000), the biomedical model is characterized by 
four tenets: 1) mental disorders are caused by abnormalities of biological 
structures, 2) each mental disorder has a specific, brain-based etiology, 3) mental 
disorders are real, categorically distinct entities which can be diagnosed, and 4)
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mental disorders are historically and panculturally universal. If the biomedical 
model of mental disorders shapes public opinion, it is unclear just how stringently 
laypeople adhere to Haslam’s (2000) “pure” biomedical model. Similarly, the 
extent to which the biomedical model filters lay conceptions of mental disorders 
is unclear.
Evidence that laypeople hold a biomedical model of mental disorders is 
partially supported by extant research on essentialist beliefs about mental 
disorders. People tend to essentialize, that is attribute an underlying essence, to 
naturally occurring social categories. That is, people can construct social 
categories, such as ethnic or sexual orientation categories, according to these 
biological essences (Hirschfeld, 1995; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Since the 
biomedical model of mental disorders maintains that each mental disorder is 
universal and has a biologically-based etiology with discrete categories (Haslam, 
2000), it follows that laypeople with a biomedical model would view mental 
disorders as real, disease-like entities with essences (Haslam & Ernst, 2002; 
Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Kendell, 1986).
Haslam and Ernst (2005) examined essentialist beliefs about mental 
disorders. Using a college sample, they presented a vignette describing the 
diagnostic criteria of a mental disorder and a debate on its origin for bulimia 
nervosa, hypochondriasis, major depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder and 
schizophrenia. Following each vignette and its accompanying etiology debate, 
participants responded to the Essentialist Beliefs Scale (Haslam et al., 2000, 2002),
which assesses 8 dimensions of an essentialist perspective: informativeness, 
historical invariance, discreteness, uniformity, immutability, necessary features, 
inherence, and naturalness. They found that participants tend to view most as 
natural kinds, meaning that they are discrete, immutable, and natural. However, 
their findings did not support the notion that mental disorders are entitative, for 
laypeople believed that the mental disorder diagnosis did not convey much 
information and that people with this disorder were not similar to one another). 
Hence, Haslam and Ernst (2005) found partial support that laypeople maintain 
essentialist beliefs about mental disorders.
In general, the direct link between essentialist beliefs about mental 
disorders and the biomedical model is better supported by theory than empirical 
research. Research suggests that essentialist beliefs may only loosely guide 
conceptions of mental disorders (Haslam & Ernst, 2005; Haslam, Rothschild, & 
Ernst, 2000). For example, Haslam and Ernst (2005) found that laypeople only 
endorsed the natural kinds dimension of essentialist beliefs, not the entitative 
dimension. Moreover, both mental health professionals and laypeople 
essentialize mental disorders less than medical disorders, such as allergies, high 
blood pressure, or chickenpox (Ahn, Flanagan, Marsh, & Sanislow, 2006). These 
findings suggest that laypeople may conceptualize mental disorders as disease­
like, but it is unlikely that laypeople strictly view mental disorders as biological, 
brain-based disease entities.
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In fact, research suggests that laypeople may differentially apply models 
of mental disorders. Specifically, laypeople may attribute different causes and 
suggest different treatments depending on the mental disorder and whether the 
diagnosis is provided. For instance, Schomerus, Matschinger, and Angermeyer 
(2006) found that laypeople were more likely to attribute biological causes, such 
as brain disease and heredity, to schizophrenia, whereas they were more likely to 
attribute psychosocial causes, such as drug abuse and stress, to depression. 
Moreover, a cross-cultural review of research over the last 15 years on lay beliefs 
about mental illness echoed similar findings (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006). 
According to their review (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006), most studies on the lay 
beliefs of mental disorders are descriptive in nature, and they use a vignette 
empirical paradigm. In addition, a substantial proportion of the public cannot 
recognize specific mental disorders well. When presented with a vignette without 
a diagnosis, laypeople worldwide tended to use a psychosocial model for 
understanding mental disorders, and they recommended psychological 
interventions for treatment. However, when laypeople were presented with both a 
vignette and a diagnosis, laypeople tended to use a psychosocial model for 
conceptualizing depression, but they used a biomedical model for conceptualizing 
schizophrenia.
Angermeyer’s and Dietrich’s (2006) cross-cultural review reveals several 
limitations of research on lay beliefs of mental disorders. For one, the findings 
are not easily generalizable to American folk conceptions of mental disorders.
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Although some research came from America, Angermeyer and Dietrich (2006) 
primarily reviewed European research on lay beliefs. The American public may 
view mental disorder etiology and treatment different from Europeans, as they 
may have differential exposure to psychopharmaceutical advertising and different 
cultural views on mental disorders. Secondly, research on lay beliefs of mental 
disorders has disproportionately focused on depression and schizophrenia. This 
indicates that various other mental disorders need to be examined in order to 
investigate folk conceptions of mental disorders, in general. Finally, extant 
research on lay beliefs of mental disorders is primarily descriptive, instead of 
theory driven. As a result, it is difficult to ascertain how laypeople use models of 
mental disorders when they conceptualize mental disorders.
Present Study
The purpose of the present study is to explore lay conceptions of various 
mental disorders. Extant attitudinal research on population beliefs about mental 
disorders has focused on European samples, the mental disorders schizophrenia 
and depression, and describing public opinion (for review, see Angermeyer & 
Dietrich, 2006). The present study will examine American lay conceptions of 
mental disorders. In addition, it will not only investigate lay views on depression 
and schizophrenia, but it will also include less frequently studied mental disorders, 
such as Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, Bipolar I Disorder, Dysthymic 
Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder. 
Furthermore, the present study will examine the aforementioned mental disorders
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in an exploratory manner in order to generate a theory of lay conceptions of 
mental disorders. Finally, the present study will investigate how lay preconceived 
biases on the etiology of mental disorders influences beliefs about the nature and 
treatment of various mental disorders.
The methodology of the present study will be loosely based on Haslam’s 
and Ernst’s (2005) empirical paradigm for essentialist beliefs on mental disorders. 
The present study will administer a web-based, anonymous survey to a population 
of young adults, who are currently enrolled in a collegiate-level Introduction to 
Psychology course. Using a vignette empirical paradigm, participants will read 
diagnostic vignettes extracted from DSM-IV Casebook (1994). Moreover, the 
vignette content will be edited for comorbid disorder, such as drug dependence 
and psychotic symptoms. After reading each diagnostic vignette, participants will 
report their beliefs on dimensions of essentialism, global functioning, and 
treatment associated with mental disorder. In addition, the participants will report 
their beliefs on the historical Nature versus Nurture controversy, which will 
indicate the degree to which participants intuitively adhere to a biomedical or 
psychosocial model of mental disorders. Unlike the essentialism study by Haslam 
and Ernst (2005), the present study will not experimentally manipulate beliefs and 
intuitions about mental disorders.
The present study hypothesizes that lay conceptions of mental disorders 
will form two broad groupings: mental disorders that are viewed as biologically- 
oriented and categorical in nature and those that are influenced by psychosocial
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factors and are dimensional in nature. Specifically, we hypothesize that laypeople 
with conceptualize Bipolar I Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, Paranoid 
Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder as cluster of mental 
disorders, since these mental disorders have empirical support for a biological 
basis. Also, we hypothesize that laypeople will conceptualize Alcohol 
Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, Dysthymic Disorder, and Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder as a different cluster of mental disorders, since these mental disorders 
have empirical support for being influenced by psychosocial factors. Moreover, 
we hypothesize that laypeople will believe that clusters of mental disorders share 
similar latent qualities (i.e., Genetic Attribution, Informativeness, Mutability, 
Psychopharmaceutical Treatment, Psychosocial Attribution, Reification) and 
similar global functioning. In addition, we hypothesize that laypeople who adhere 
to a biomedical model, psychosocial model, or biomedical-psychosocial dialectic 
model of mental disorders will conceptualize clusters of mental disorders 
differently, since their attribution model of mental disorders will frame their 
beliefs and intuitions about the clusters of mental disorders.
Method
Participants
Total participants were 400 undergraduates enrolled in psychology 
introductory courses at the College of William and Mary. Since 6 participants 
withdrew from the study, data was collected from 394 participants (245 females 
and 149 males), who received course credit for research participation.
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Participants consisted of 242 freshmen (age M=  18.26, SD = 1.41), 97 
sophomores (age M =  19.29, SD = 2.77), 28 juniors (age M — 20.50, SD = 1.77), 
and 27 seniors (age M — 21.41, SD = 3.98). In addition, participants ethnically 
self-identified as African American (7.4 %), Asian (7.1 %), Biracial (3.6 %), 
Caucasian (75.1 %), Hispanic (3.6 %), Native American (.3 %), or Other (3 %).
For most participants (94.9 %), formal course work in psychology was 
limited to introductory classes. Yet, some participants had completed 2 
psychology courses (4.3 %) and 3 or more psychology courses (.8 %).
Participants’ academic majors included Undecided (22.6%), Psychology (7.6 %), 
Hard Sciences/Neuroscience (24.1 %), Other Social Sciences (10.9 %), 
Humanities (20.8 %), Education (2 %), and Business (11.9 %). 258 participants 
intended to double major, which is a common decision at the College of William 
and Mary. Double majors included Psychology (7.4 %), Hard 
Sciences/Neuroscience (14.5 %), Other Social Sciences (9.9 %), Humanities 
(24.4 %), Education (2.5 %), and Business (6.9 %).
Moreover, the degree of personal exposure to mental disorders varied 
among participants, (19.3 % None, 25.9 % Minimal, 20.1 % Somewhat, 15.2 % 
Fair Amount, and 19.5 % A lot). Participants reported personally knowing 
someone diagnosed with the following mental disorders: Diagnosis Unknown 
(5.36 %), Depression (17.6 %), Anxiety (2.79 %), Bipolar Disorder (16.52 %), 
Schizophrenia (4.51 %), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (5.58 %), Eating 
Disorder (1.72 %), Attention Deficit Disorder/Attention Deficit Hyperactive
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Disorder (3.43 %), Alcoholism (.43 %), Borderline Personality Disorder (.21 %), 
Narcissism (.43 %), Autism (5.58 %), Learning Disorder (.86 %), Mental 
Retardation (11.16 %), Alzheimer’s/Dementia (3.0 %), Tourette’s (1.07 %), 
Insanity (.64 %), Biological Disease (e.g., stroke or cancer, 1.72 %), and Reactive 
Attachment Disorder (.21 %). 57 participants (14.5 %) listed multiple mental 
disorder diagnoses.
Materials
Mental Disorder Diagnostic Vignettes. Eight diagnostic vignettes 
illustrating mental disorders were extracted from the DSM-IV Casebook (1994). 
Content was edited for comorbid disorder, such as drug dependence and psychotic 
symptoms. The researchers revised the following diagnostic vignettes: 
Thunderbird for Alcohol Dependence (see Appendix A), Sixty-seven Pound 
Weakling for Anorexia Nervosa (see Appendix B), Roller Coaster for Bipolar I 
Disorder (see Appendix C), Junior Executive for Dysthymic Disorder (see 
Appendix D), Foster Mother for Major Depressive Disorder (see Appendix E), 
Under Surveillance for Paranoid Schizophrenia (see Appendix F), Flashbacks for 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (see Appendix G), and Wash Before Wearing for 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder (see Appendix H). Since diagnostic vignettes 
originated from the DSM-IV Casebook (1994), all mental disorders were 
presented in a manner consistent with traditional psychiatric diagnostic 
procedures and context. Each diagnostic vignette described the respective mental
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disorder symptomology and concluded with the psychiatrist diagnosing the 
mental disorder.
Nature vs. Nurture Debate. A prompt overviewed the classic nature vs. 
nurture psychology debate (see Appendix I). To maintain an untendentious 
stance, the debate overview only acknowledged that some psychological 
professionals attribute mental disorders to genetic factors, whereas other 
psychological professionals attribute mental disorders to environmental factors. 
Measures
Genetic Attribution. “This disorder is most likely primarily caused by a 
genetic, neurochemical, or brain-based dysfunction.” This item was assessed by a 
5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 
5 = Strongly Agree).
Informativeness. “This disorder is an informative diagnostic category. 
Knowing that someone has this disorder tells us a lot about the person.” This item 
was assessed by a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = 
Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree).
Mutability. “This disorder can be cured.” This item was assessed by a 5- 
point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 
= Strongly Agree).
Psychopharmaceutical Treatment. “This disorder can be effectively 
treated with psychopharmaceuticals (i.e., meds).” This item was assessed by a 5-
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point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 2 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 
= Strongly Agree).
Psychosocial Attribution. “This disorder probably is the result of the 
combination of stress and life experiences.” This item was assessed by a 5-point 
Likert scale (7 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = 
Strongly Agree).
Reification. “This disorder refers to a social construct rather than an 
objective bodily disorder.” This item was assessed by a 5-point Likert scale (7 = 
Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree).
Global Assessment o f  Functioning Scale (GAF). The GAF scale (see 
Appendix J; DSM-IV-TR, 2000) quantifies the quality of one’s occupational and 
relational pursuits according to a numerical continuum of 100 (optimal mental 
health) to 0 (severely mental illness). The GAF Scale satisfies Axis V, or Global 
Functioning, of the Multiaxial Assessment of mental disorders, and it is used by 
all diagnosticians.
Nature Argument. The nature argument strongly endorses the biomedical 
model of mental disorders (see Appendix K). It argues that mental disorders are 
caused by genetic factors, or one’s “nature.” This item was assessed by a 5-point 
Likert scale (7 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = 
Strongly Agree).
Nurture Argument. The nurture argument strongly endorses the 
psychosocial model of mental disorders (see Appendix L). It argues that mental
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disorders are caused by environmental factors, or one’s “nurture.” This item was 
assessed by a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = 
Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree).
Procedure
Using Sona Systems, participants completed an anonymous, online 
computer survey that explored their beliefs and conceptualizations about various 
mental disorders. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire that 
assessed their educational background in psychology, their anticipated academic 
major, and their prior exposure to mental disorders.
Next, participants were presented with 8 mental disorder diagnostic 
vignettes. Following each diagnostic vignette, participants responded to items 
that assessed their individual understanding of each illustrated mental disorder 
(i.e., Genetic Attribution, Informativeness, Mutability, Psychopharmaceutical 
Treatment, Psychosocial Attribution, Reification, and GAF). The online 
computer survey research design allowed participants to be presented with all 
diagnostic vignettes and their accompanying items in randomized order.
Finally, participants read an overview of the Nature vs. Nurture Debate. 
Participants then responded to the degree to which they endorsed the Nature 
Argument and the Nurture Argument, which were likewise presented in 
randomized order.
Results
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
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Table 1 presents the descriptive analyses for the clinical vignette measures 
(i.e., Genetic Attribution, Informativeness, Mutability, Psychopharmaceutical 
Treatment, Psychosocial Attribution, Reification, and GAF). Using these clinical 
vignette measures, we performed a series of exploratory factor analyses (EFA) to 
generate a theory regarding the latent structure of lay classification of various 
mental disorders (Henson & Roberts, 2006).
To evaluate the appropriateness of EFA with the data set, we considered 
our sample size, Bartlett’s test of sphericity, and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy. Firstly, Tabachnik and Fidell (1996) recommend 
at least 300 cases for a data set to be suitable for factor analysis. With 394 
participants, our sample size was suitable for EFA. Secondly, Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was used to check for variable independence in conjunction with EFA. 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was obtained for each clinical vignette measure: 
Genetic Attribution (410.17,/? < .001), Informativeness (829.53,/? < .001), 
Mutability (567.58,/? < .001), Psychopharmaceutical Treatment (480.54,/?
< .001), Psychosocial Attribution (380.95,/? < .001), Reification (501. 05,/?
< .001), and GAF (479.85,/? < .001). These values for Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
suggest that the variables are independent and are, therefore, suitable for EFA. 
Finally, we obtained the KMO measure of sampling adequacy to indicate the 
proportion of common variance in the measured variables. As a general rule of 
thumb, KMO values over .60 are considered appropriate for EFA. The KMO 
value obtained for each clinical vignette measure suggested were Genetic
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Attribution (.767), Informativeness (.853), Mutability (.793), 
Psychopharmaceutical Treatment (.762), Psychosocial Attribution (.731), 
Reification (.794), and GAF (.838). Based on the sample size, Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity, and KMO measure of sampling adequacy, we determined that the data 
set was, indeed, appropriate for EFA.
We proceeded to separately test each clinical vignette measure across all 
mental disorders using a series of principal components analyses with direct 
oblimin rotation. We used an oblique rotation, because it more accurately reflects 
real-world phenomena, which are often correlated. For all EFA analyses, factors 
were extracted according to the Kaiser criterion that eigenvalues be at least 1.00 
(Kaiser, 1960). Moreover, for a mental disorder to be retained for a factor, its 
factor loading on the structure matrix exceeded .40 and its loadings demonstrated 
a similar trend on the pattern matrix.
Genetic Attribution. The EFA defined two factors (see Table 2). The first 
factor had an eigenvalue of 2.513, and it explained 31.4% of the variance. The 
second factor had an eigenvalue of 1.335, and it explained 16.7% of the variance. 
Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder 
loaded on the first factor, whereas, Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder loaded on the second factor. Dysthymic Disorder 
and Major Depressive Disorder loaded on both factors.
Informativeness. The EFA only defined a single factor, which terminated 
further analysis.
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Mutability. The EFA defined two factors (see Table 3). The first factor 
had an eigenvalue of 2.931, and it explained 36.6% of the variance. The second 
factor had an eigenvalue of 1.107, and it explained 13.8% of the variance.
Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder loaded on the first factor. Alcohol Dependence 
and Anorexia Nervosa loaded on the second factor. Again, Dysthymic Disorder 
and Major Depressive Disorder loaded on both factors.
Psychopharmaceutical Treatment. The EFA defined two factors (see 
Table 4). The first factor had an eigenvalue of 2.585, and it explained 32.3% of 
the variance. The second factor had an eigenvalue of 1.456, and it explained 
18.2% of the variance. Bipolar I Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder, Major 
Depressive Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality 
Disorder loaded on the first factor. Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder loaded on the second factor.
Psychosocial Attribution. The EFA defined two factors (see Table 5).
The first factor had an eigenvalue of 2.372, and it explained 29.6% of the variance. 
The second factor had an eigenvalue of 1.400, and it explained 17.5% of the 
variance. Bipolar I Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder loaded on the first factor. Alcohol Dependence, 
Anorexia Nervosa, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder loaded on the second factor. 
Major Depressive Disorder loaded on both factors.
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Reification. The EFA defined two factors (see Table 6). The first factor 
had an eigenvalue of 2.771, and it explained 34.6% of the variance. The second 
factor had an eigenvalue of 1.221, and it explained 15.3% of the variance.
Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder 
loaded on the first factor. Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder loaded on the second factor. Dysthymic Disorder 
and Major Depressive Disorder loaded on both factors.
GAF. The EFA only defined a single factor, which terminated further 
analysis.
EFA Series Analyses Interpretation. Using visual qualitative inspection of 
the pattern and structure matrices for the EFA series analyses, we determined that 
the laypeople do not classify various mental disorders as conceptually distinct.
The EFA analyses series suggest that laypeople intuitively cluster mental 
disorders according to their latent qualities. The mental disorders Bipolar I 
Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder were 
consistently clustered on the first factor. Since research suggests that Bipolar I 
Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder have a 
strong genetic component, the first factor could be defined as genetic factors. 
Hence, Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality 
Disorder could be clustered as Genetic Disorders.
Conversely, Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder consistently loaded on the second factor. Since research suggests
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that Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
are strongly influenced by one’s environment, the second factor could be defined 
as environmental factors. Hence, Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder could be clustered as Psychosocial Disorders.
Interestingly, Dysthymic Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder tended 
to load on both factors. This pattern suggests that laypeople conceptualize 
Dysthymic Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder as being influenced by both 
genetic and environmental factors. The consistent straddling of the genetic and 
environmental factors suggests that Dysthymic Disorder and Major Depressive 
Disorder are a distinct mental disorder cluster, which could be categorized as 
Depressive Disorders.
Figure 1 depicts the clustering of mental disorders according to factor 
loadings on genetic and environmental factors from the EFA series analyses. 
Confirmatory Mental Disorder Clustering MANOVA
To confirm the clustering of mental disorders according to EFA were 
conceptually distinct, a 3 (Mental Disorder Cluster: Genetic, Depressive, and 
Psychosocial Disorders) X 7 (Clinical Vignette Measures: Genetic Attribution, 
Informativeness, Mutability, Psychopharmaceutical Treatment, Psychosocial 
Attribution, Reification, and GAF) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
with repeated measures was performed. The MANOVA revealed a significant 
overall effect between mental disorder clustering and lay beliefs about mental 
disorders, Wilks’ A = .326, F (  14, 2346) = 126.05, p  < .001. In addition,
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univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) indicated significant main effects 
between mental disorder clustering and each clinical vignette measure (see Table 
7).
Since the purpose of the MANOVA was to confirm the clustering of 
mental disorders into Genetic, Depressive, and Psychosocial Disorders, we used 
Tukey’s HSD homogenous subsets post-hoc test, which significantly described 
the data (p < .05). Except for Informativeness, each clinical vignette measure 
grouped into a significantly distinct homogenous subsets which orthogonally 
corresponded with the mental disorder clusters of Genetic, Depressive, and 
Psychosocial Disorders from the EFA (see Table 8). For Informativeness,
Genetic Disorders (M=  3.41, SD = .78) grouped into one subset, Depressive 
Disorders (M = 3.23, SD = .77) grouped into the other subset, and Psychosocial 
Disorders (M=  3.32, SD = .75) grouped into both subsets, suggesting that 
Informativeness may not be an important criterion for mental disorders with 
laypeople.
The results of Tukey’s HSD homogenous subsets post-hoc analysis 
confirm that laypeople group Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder into a one classification, which could be labeled 
Genetic Disorders; Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder into another classification, which could be labeled Psychosocial 
Disorders, and Dysthymic Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder into a third 
classification, which could be labeled Depressive Disorders. Theses findings
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suggest that relative to other mental disorders, laypeople tend to classify and 
conceptualize the mental disorders within a cluster in a similar manner.
Attribution Model o f  Mental Disorders
To test our final hypothesis, we examined the interaction between a 
layperson’s attribution model of mental disorders and his or her beliefs regarding 
the mental disorders within each clustering.
Attribution Model Profiles. Using a 5-point Likert scale, participants 
responded to the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the Nature 
Argument and the Nurture Argument. From combined responses to the Nature 
and Nurture Arguments, we created profile for each participant to reflect his or 
her world view on the attribution of mental disorders. For the Biomedical Profile 
(N = 110), participants responded Nature > 4 and Nurture < 2. The Biomedical 
Profile characterizes strong support for biological explanations of mental 
disorders and relatively low support for psychosocial explanations. For the 
Moderate Profile (N=  210), participants responded Nature = 3 | 4 and Nurture =
3 | 4. The Moderate Profile incorporates the interaction of gene expression within 
one’s environment into one’s attribution model of mental disorders. For the 
Psychosocial Profile (N=  15), participants responded Nature < 2 and Nurture > 4. 
The Psychosocial Profile is characterized by strong support for psychosocial 
explanations of mental disorders and relatively low support for biological 
explanations. For the Mixed Predictor Profile (N = 59), participants did not 
satisfy the criteria for the Biomedical, Moderate, and Psychosocial Profiles.
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Participants in the Mixed Predictor Profile either had converging, polarized 
responses, or they had one moderate response and one extreme response. Hence, 
inferences on the attribution model of mental disorders for participants with a 
Mixed Predictor Profile could not be made.
Analytic Strategy. A series of 4 (Attribution Model Profile: Biomedical, 
Moderate, Psychosocial, and Mixed Predictor) X 7 (Clinical Vignette Measures: 
Genetic Attribution, Informativeness, Mutability, Psychopharmaceutical 
Treatment, Psychosocial Attribution, Reification, and GAF) multivariate analysis 
of variance (MANOVA) with repeated measures were performed for each mental 
disorder cluster. A significant interaction was followed by Tukey’s HSD post-hoc 
test for multiple comparisons to locate the effect.
Genetic Disorders Cluster. The MANOVA revealed a significant overall 
effect between mental disorder clustering and lay beliefs about mental disorders, 
Wilks’ A = .013, F  (7, 384) = 4166.56,/? < .001. In addition, univariate analyses 
of variance (ANOVAs) indicated significant main effects between mental 
disorder clustering and each clinical vignette measure (see Table 9).
These main effects were located using Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test for 
multiple comparisons. For Genetic Attribution, the Biomedical Profile was 
significantly different from the Moderate (.29,/? < .001), Psychosocial (.52,/?
< .01), and Mixed Predictor Profiles (.28,/? < .01). For Mutability, the 
Biomedical Profile was significantly different from the Moderate (-.22,/? < .05) 
and Psychosocial (-.51 ,P <  .05) Profiles. For Psychosocial Attribution, the
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Biomedical Profile was significantly different from the Moderate (-.48, p  < .001), 
Psychosocial (-.69, p  < .01), and Mixed Predictor Profiles (-.57,/? < .001). For 
Reification, the Biomedical Profile was significantly different from the Moderate 
(-.38,/? < .001), Psychosocial (-.77,/? < .001), and Mixed Predictor Profiles (-.32, 
p  < .05). For GAF, the Psychosocial Profile was significantly different from the 
Biomedical (9.04,/? < .05) and Mixed Predictor Profiles (8.15,/? < .05).
Depressive Disorders Cluster. The MANOVA revealed a significant 
overall effect between mental disorder clustering and lay beliefs about mental 
disorders, Wilks’ A = .015, F (7, 384) = 3608.70,/? < .001. In addition, univariate 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) indicated significant main effects between 
mental disorder clustering and each clinical vignette measure (see Table 10).
These main effects were located using Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test for 
multiple comparisons. For Genetic Attribution, the Biomedical Profile was 
significantly different from the Moderate (.34,/? < .001), Psychosocial (1.06,/?
< .001), and Mixed Predictor Profiles (.58,/? < .001). For Informativeness, the 
Biomedical Profile is significantly different from the Psychosocial (-.65,/? < .05) 
and Mixed Predictor Profiles (-.36,/? < .05). For Mutability, the Psychosocial 
Profile was significantly different from the Biomedical (.75,/? < .01) and the 
Moderate Profiles (.58,/? < .05). For Psychopharmaceutical Treatment, the 
Psychosocial Profile was significantly different from the Biomedical (-.75,/?
< .001), Moderate (-.66,/? < .01), and the Mixed Predictor Profiles (-.59,/? < .05). 
For Psychosocial Attribution, the Biomedical Profile was significantly different
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from the Moderate (-.26, p  < .01) and Psychosocial Profiles (-.52,/? < .05). For 
Reification, the Biomedical Profile was significantly different from the Moderate 
(-.40,/? < .001), Psychosocial (-.67,/? < .01), and Mixed Predictor Profiles (-.50,/? 
< .001). For GAF, the Psychosocial Profile was significantly different from the 
Biomedical Profile (8.05,/? < .05).
Psychosocial Disorders Cluster. The MANOVA revealed a significant 
overall effect between mental disorder clustering and lay beliefs about mental 
disorders, Wilks’ A = .011, F (7, 384) = 4911.18,/? < .001. In addition, univariate 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) indicated significant main effects between 
mental disorder clustering and each clinical vignette measure (see Table 11).
These main effects were located using Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test for 
multiple comparisons. For Genetic Attribution, the Biomedical Profile was 
significantly different from the Psychosocial Profile (.53,/? < .05). For 
Informativeness, the Biomedical Profile is significantly different from the 
Moderate (-.31 ,P <  .01), Psychosocial (-.58,/? < .05), and Mixed Predictor 
Profiles (-.34,/? < .05). For Mutability, the Psychosocial Profile was significantly 
different from the Biomedical Profile (.62,/? < .01). For Psychosocial Attribution, 
the Mixed Predictor Profile was significantly different from the Biomedical (.27,
/? < .01) and Moderate Profiles (.22,/? < .01).
Discussion
The findings partially supported the hypothesis that laypeople cluster 
mental disorders into two broad groupings: one cluster of mental disorders that
32
are biologically-oriented and categorical in nature and the other cluster of mental 
disorders are influenced by psychosocial factors and are dimensional in nature. In 
actuality, the results indicated that laypeople conceptualize mental disorders into 
three broad clusters. The first cluster of mental disorders, which included Bipolar 
I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder, were 
labeled Genetic Disorders, since these mental disorders have a strong biological, 
brain-based component. Laypeople believed the Genetic Disorders cluster shared 
latent qualities, according to the dimensions of genetic attribution, mutability, 
psychopharmaceutical treatment, psychosocial attribution, and reification. The 
second cluster of mental disorders, which included Alcohol Dependence,
Anorexia Nervosa, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, were labeled as 
Psychosocial Disorders, since these mental disorders are likely to be strongly 
influenced by psychosocial factors, such as life stressors. Laypeople believed that 
the Psychosocial Disorders cluster shared similar latent qualities, according to the 
dimensions of genetic attribution, psychopharmaceutical treatment, psychosocial 
attribution, and reification. For the dimension of mutability, only Alcohol 
Dependence and Anorexia Nervosa were viewed similarly. The third cluster of 
mental disorders, which included Dysthymic Disorder and Major Depressive 
Disorder, was labeled Depressive Disorders. Laypeople conceptualize the 
Depressive Disorders cluster as being influenced by both genetic and 
environmental clusters. As a result, the Depressive Disorders cluster shares some 
latent qualities with the Genetic Disorders and other latent qualities with the
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Psychosocial Disorders. Firstly, laypeople believed the Depressive Disorders 
shared genetic attribution, mutability, and reification with both the Genetic 
Disorders and the Psychosocial Disorders. Secondly, laypeople believed the 
Depressive Disorders shared psychopharmaceutical treatment with the Genetic 
Disorders. Thirdly, laypeople believed that Dysthymic Disorder shared 
psychosocial attribution with the Genetic Disorders, whereas Major Depressive 
Disorder shared psychosocial attribution with both the Genetic Disorders and 
Psychosocial Disorders
Our second set of hypotheses regarding the influence of intuitive 
attribution models on beliefs about mental disorders was also partially supported. 
For the Genetic Disorders cluster of mental disorders, laypeople who ascribe to a 
biomedical model conceptualized the latent qualities of genetic attribution, 
mutability, psychosocial attribution, reification, and GAF from laypeople who 
espouse a psychosocial model or dialectic model. For the Depressive Disorders 
cluster of mental disorders, laypeople with a biomedical model conceptualized the 
latent qualities genetic attribution, informativeness, mutability, 
psychopharmaceutical treatment, psychosocial attribution, reification, and GAF 
differently that laypeople with a psychosocial model of mental disorders. 
Laypeople with a dialectic model of mental disorders sided with those with a 
biomedical model for mutability and psychopharmaceutical treatment, whereas 
they sided with those with a psychosocial model for genetic attribution, 
psychosocial attribution, and reification. For the Psychosocial Disorders cluster
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of mental disorders, laypeople with a biomedical model conceptualized the latent 
qualities genetic attribution, informativeness, mutability, and psychosocial 
attribution differently than laypeople with a psychosocial model. Laypeople with 
a dialectic model of mental disorders sided with those with a biomedical model 
for the psychosocial attribution, whereas they sided with those with a 
psychosocial model for informativeness.
Cumulatively, the results suggest that laypeople do not conceptualize each 
mental disorder as a distinct category. In fact, the findings indicate that laypeople 
cluster mental disorders into three broad groupings, with each cluster sharing 
common properties along a continuum of genetic and environmental influences. 
Specifically, laypeople cluster Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, because they view these mental disorders as 
largely the result of psychosocial factors. On the other hand, laypeople cluster 
Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder, 
because these disorders are influenced by genetic factors. Laypeople cluster 
Major Depressive Disorder and Dysthymic Disorder, because they apparently 
view these mental disorders as influenced by both genetic and environmental 
factors.
Interestingly, laypeople’s beliefs about mental disorders were 
contextualized by their own intuitive attribution model for mental disorders. In 
general, laypeople with a biomedical model viewed Genetic Disorders and 
Psychosocial Disorders differently that laypeople with a psychosocial model or
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biomedical-psychosocial model. For the Depressive Disorders, there was more 
variance in how laypeople conceptualized mental disorders. Although laypeople 
with a biomedical model differed from those with a psychosocial model, 
laypeople with a dialectic biomedical-psychosocial model held varying beliefs.
Firstly, the results suggest that laypeople do not conceptualize mental 
disorders according the a “pure” biomedical model. According to Haslam (2000), 
the biomedical model asserts that each mental disorder has a specific, brain-based 
etiology and mental disorders are real, categorically distinct entities which can be 
diagnosed. Yet, laypeople differentially conceptualized mental disorders 
according to broad groupings, not discrete categories. In addition, laypeople 
believed some disorders (i.e., the Genetic Disorders cluster) had a biologically- 
oriented, brain based etiology, other disorders (i.e., the Psychosocial Disorders 
cluster) had a psychosocial etiology, and still other disorders (i.e., the Depressive 
Disorders cluster) had a dualistic etiology stemming from both genetic and 
environmental factors. This suggests that regardless of one’s intuitive causal 
model, laypeople categorize mental disorders into broad clusters. Secondly, 
laypeople conceptualize discrete clusters of mental disorders along a dimensional 
continuum of mental disorder etiology. This finding might explain why extant 
research on lay beliefs about mental disorders report laypeople categorize mental 
disorders as either biomedical or psychosocial in nature (for review, see 
Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006). After all, most studies on lay beliefs about 
mental disorders only investigate schizophrenia and depression. Since only two
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mental disorders are examined, researchers can only detect a bifurcated 
perspective, not a continuum. Thirdly, the results of the present study indicate 
that lay biases and preconceived notions on the causal attribution of mental 
disorders does contextualize one’s conceptions of mental disorders.
These findings have several implications. For one, they raise important 
questions about the current diagnostic system and the prevalence of the neo- 
Kraepelin biomedical model of mental disorders. After all, the results indicated 
that laypeople do not conceptualize and categorize mental disorders in manner 
consistent with the DSM-IV-TR. Specifically, laypeople do not view each mental 
disorder as a unique entity. This may suggest that some mental disorders, such a 
Paranoid Schizophrenia and Bipolar I Disorder, are conceptualized as “true” 
mental disorders by laypeople, whereas other mental disorders, such as Alcohol 
Dependence and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, are conceptualized as common 
problems of living. Hence, the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic classification of mental 
disorders and the biomedical model may be appropriate for some mental disorders, 
but not others. Secondly, the findings of the present study could have interesting 
implications for the stigma of mental disorders. Historically, individuals with 
mental disorders have been stigmatized and deligitimized by society (Alexander 
& Selesnick, 1995; Hinshaw & Cicchetti, 2000). A biomedical model for 
understanding the Genetic Disorders cluster could minimize stigma. After all, the 
biomedical explanation of mental disorders could alleviate personal responsibility 
from having a mental disorder. On the other hand, there is the possibility that a
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biomedical explanation of mental disorders could augment stigmatization, since 
essentialist beliefs are associated with prejudice (e.g., Haslam & Levy, 2006).
The present study had several empirical limitations. For one, the study 
used a college sample of undergraduates who are currently enrolled in an 
Introductory Psychology course. The curriculum of the Psychology department 
requires that students take an introduction to psychology as a social science and 
an introduction to psychology as a natural science. Hence, the sample may be 
familiar with the biomedical and psychosocial models of mental disorders, despite 
the fact that they have no formal training in psychopathology. For this reason, the 
present sample may not be representative of other college samples in which the 
participants are enrolled in an Introductory Psychology course.
The second limitation of the study was the vignette empirical paradigm. 
Since one of the implications of lay conceptions of mental disorders is 
stigmatization, then it is important to understand how laypeople conceptualize 
mental disorders in a real-world context. The current study used diagnostic 
vignettes. However, laypeople will realistically encounter mental disorders 
through the media and personal experience. Hence, it may be advantageous to 
use a video paradigm in which participants could view clips of individuals with 
mental disorders. A third limitation of the study is the statistical analyses. The 
most appropriate statistical test to investigate lay conceptions of mental disorders 
is a hierarchical factor analysis. During a hierarchical factor analysis, an 
exploratory factor analysis is followed by a confirmatory factor analysis. This, in
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effect, generates a theoretical model, and it then tests that model. However, the 
statistical software available would not accommodate this statistical procedure.
The present study suggests several directions for future research. For one, 
it is important for future studies to investigate lay conceptions of mental disorders 
among the general population, psychological researchers, and other mental health 
care professionals. This work could have important implications for the structure 
of the psychological and psychiatric professions. Specifically, it might provide 
much needed guidance and consensus for the classification of mental disorders.
In addition, future research should consider more realistic paradigms. In order to 
examine the interaction between conceptions of mental disorders and the stigma 
of mental disorders, it is important to investigate lay perceptions of mental 
disorders in realistic contexts.
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Appendix A 
Alcohol Dependence Vignette 
A 43-year-old divorced carpenter is examined in the hospital emergency room 
because for the last few days he has been confused and unable to take care of 
himself. The patient's sister is available to provide some information. The sister 
reports that the patient has consumed large quantities of cheap wine daily for over 
5 years. He had a reasonably stable home life and job record until his wife left 
him for another man 5 years previously. The sister indicates that the patient drinks 
more than a fifth of wine a day, and that this has been an unvarying pattern since 
the divorce. He often has blackouts from drinking and has missed work; 
consequently, he has been fired from several jobs. Fortunately for him, carpenters 
are in great demand, and he has been able to provide marginally for himself 
during those years. However, 3 days ago he ran out of money and wine and had to 
beg on the street to buy a meal. The patient has been poorly nourished, eating 
perhaps one meal a day and evidently relying on the wine as his prime source of 
nourishment. The psychiatrist diagnosed the carpenter with Alcohol Dependence.
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Appendix B 
Anorexia Nervosa
When Peggy was first evaluated for admission to an inpatient eating disorder 
program, she was a 20-year-old woman who had difficulty supporting her 5’3” 
body with a weight of only 67 pounds. She had begun to lose weight 4 years 
earlier, initially dieting to lose and unwanted 6 pounds. Encouraged by 
complements on her new body, she proceeded to lose 8 more pounds. Over the 
next 2 years she continued to lose weight, increased her physical activity, and 
stopped menstruating. When Peggy went off to college, where, with increased 
academic and social demands, she dieted until she weighed 67 pounds. Her 
eating habits were ritualized: she cut food into very small pieces, moved them 
around on the plate, and ate very slowly. She resisted eating foods with high fat 
and carbohydrate content. She was troubled by the changes in her body, and 
became increasingly anxious as her figure developed. Peggy was forced to drop 
out of school and to accept a hospitalization, where a psychiatrist diagnosed her 
with Anorexia Nervosa.
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Appendix C 
Bipolar I Disorder
The troubles of Ernest Eaton, age 37, began 7 years before when he was working 
as an insurance adjuster. Mr. Eaton began experiencing dramatic mood changes. 
This pattern of alternating periods of elation and depression, apparently with few 
“normal” days, repeated itself continuously over the following years. During his 
energetic periods, Mr. Eaton was optimistic and self-confident, but short tempered 
and easily irritated. His judgment at work was erratic. He spent large sums of 
money on unnecessary and, for him, uncharacteristic purchases, such as a high- 
priced stereo system and several Doberman pinschers. He also had several 
impulsive sex flings. During his depressive periods, he often stayed in bed all day 
because of fatigue, lack of motivation, and depressed mood. He stopped eating, 
bathing, and shaving. After several days of this withdrawal, Mr. Eaton would rise 
from bed one morning feeling better and, within 2 days, be back at work, often 
feverishly, though ineffectively, to catch up on work he had let slide during his 
depressed periods. The psychiatrist diagnosed Mr. Eaton with Bipolar I Disorder.
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Appendix D 
Dysthymic Disorder 
A 28-year-old junior executive was referred by a senior psychoanalyst for 
“supportive” treatment. She had obtained a master’s degree in business 
administration and moved to California 1.5 years earlier to begin work at a large 
firm. She complained of being “depressed” about everything: her job, her 
husband, and her prospects for the future. She claims that she’s had persistent 
feelings of depressed mood, inferiority, and pessimism since the age of 16 or 17. 
Although she did reasonably well in college, she consistently ruminated about 
those students who were “genuinely intelligent.” She dated during college and 
graduate school, but claimed that she never went after a guy she thought was 
“special,” always feeling inferior and intimidated. Just after graduation, she 
married the man she was going out with at the time. She thought of him as 
reasonably desirable, though not “special,” and married him primarily because she 
felt she needed a husband for companionship. Recently she has also been having 
difficulties at work. She is assigned the most menial tasks at the firm and is never 
given an assignment of importance or responsibility. The psychiatrist diagnosed 
the junior executive with Dysthymic Disorder.
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Appendix E 
Major Depressive Disorder 
Cheryl Jones is a 44-year-old mother of 3 teenagers and a foster mother. One 
year previously, after an argument with her lover, she became acutely distraught. 
Over a 3-week period she stayed in her apartment, had new locks put on the doors, 
kept the shades down, and avoided everyone but her immediate family. Even 
once she began to feel “back to normal,” she seemed to lose her energy and 
motivation to do anything. She became increasingly depressed, lost her appetite, 
and woke at 4:00 a.m. or 5:00 a.m. every morning and was unable to get back to 
sleep. She could no longer read a newspaper or watch TV because she couldn’t 
concentrate. Ms. Jones’ condition has persisted for 9 months. She has done very 
little except sit in her apartment, staring at the walls. Her children have managed 
most of the cooking, shopping, bill paying, and so on. During Ms. Jones’ 
hospitalization for treatment, the psychiatrist diagnosed her with Major 
Depressive Disorder.
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Appendix F 
Paranoid Schizophrenia 
Mr. Simpson is a 44-year-old, single, unemployed white man brought to the 
emergency room by the police for striking an elderly woman in his apartment 
building. His chief complaint is, “That damn bitch. She and the rest of them 
deserved more than that for what they put me through.” The patient has been ill 
since age 22. During his first year of law school, he gradually became more and 
more convinced that his classmates were making fun of him. He noticed that they 
would snort and sneeze whenever he entered the classroom. When a girl he was 
dating broke off the relationship with him, he believed that she had been 
“replaced” by a look-alike. He called the police and asked for their help to solve 
the “kidnapping.” Today, Mr. Simpson maintains that his apartment is the center 
of a large communication system that involves all three major television networks, 
his neighbors, and apparently hundreds of “actors” in his neighborhood. There 
are secret cameras in his apartment that carefully monitor all his activities. When 
he is watching TV, many of his minor actions (e.g., going to the bathroom) are 
soon directly commented on by the announcer. Whenever he goes outside, the 
“actors” have all been warned to keep him under surveillance. Everyone on the 
street watches him. His neighbors operate two different “machines;” one is 
responsible for all of his voices, except the “joker.” He is not certain who 
controls this voice, which visits him only occasionally and is very funny. The 
other voices, which he hears many times each day, are generated by this machine,
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which he sometimes thinks is directly run by the elderly neighbor whom he 
attacked. The psychiatrist diagnosed Mr. Simpson with Paranoid Schizophrenia.
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Appendix G 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
A 23-year-old Vietnam veteran was admitted to the hospital 1 year after the end 
of the Vietnam War, at the request of his wife, when he began to experience 
depression, insomnia, and “flashbacks” of his wartime experiences. He had been 
honorably discharged, having spent nearly a year in combat. At about the time of 
the fall of Saigon, he became preoccupied with watching TV news stories about 
this event. He then began to have difficulty sleeping, and at times would awaken 
at night in the midst of a nightmare in which he was reliving his past war 
experiences. His wife became particularly concerned one day when he had a 
flashback while out in the backyard: as a plane flew overhead, flying somewhat 
lower than usual, the patient threw himself to the ground, seeking cover, thinking 
it was an attacking helicopter. The more he watched the news on TV, the more 
agitated and morose he became. Stories began to spill out of him about horrifying 
atrocities like those he had seen and experienced, and he began to feel guilty that 
he had survived when many of his friends had not. At times he also seemed angry 
and bitter, feeling that the sacrifices he and others made were all wasted. His 
preoccupation with Vietnam had become so intense that he seemed uninterested 
in anything else and emotionally distant from his wife. When she suggested that 
they try to plan their future, including having a family, he responded as if his life 
currently consisted completely of the world of events experienced during Vietnam,
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as if he had no future. The psychiatrist diagnosed the vet with Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder.
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Appendix H 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder 
A 41-year-old man was referred to a community health center’s activities program 
for help in improving his social skills. He had a lifelong pattern of social isolation, 
with no real friends, and spent long hours worrying that his angry thoughts about 
his older brother would cause his brother harm. He had previously worked as a 
clerk in civil service but had lost his job because of poor attendance and low 
productivity. On interview the patient was distant and somewhat distrustful. He 
described in elaborate and often irrelevant detail his rather uneventful and routine 
daily life. For instance, he told the interviewer that he had spent and hour and a 
half in a pet store deciding which of two brands of fish food to buy and explained 
their relative merits. He asked the interviewer whether, if he joined the program, 
he would be required to participate in groups. He said that groups made him very 
nervous because he felt that if he revealed too much personal information, such as 
the amount of money that he had in the bank, people would take advantage of him 
or manipulate him for their own benefit. The psychiatrist diagnosed this man with 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder.
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Appendix I 
Nature vs. Nurture Debate 
The fields of psychology and psychiatry have been embroiled in controversy 
about whether or not biological factors cause mental disorders. Some 
psychologists and psychiatrists argue that most mental disorders are due to 
biological factors such as genes, disturbances in brain chemistry, or hormonal 
difficulties. Others argue that most mental disorders are due to non-biological 
factors such as psychological conflicts, traumatic life experiences, or 
dysfunctional family environments.
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Appendix J
Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF)
100 Superior functioning in a wide range of activities, life's problems never seem 
to get out of hand, is sought out by others because of his or her many 
positive qualities. No symptoms.
90 Absent or minimal symptoms, good functioning in all areas, interested and
involved in a wide range of activities, socially effective, generally satisfied 
with life, no more than everyday problems or concerns.
80 If symptoms are present, they are transient and expectable reactions to 
psychosocial stressors; no more than slight impairment in social, 
occupational, or school functioning.
70 Some mild symptoms OR some difficulty in social, occupational, or school 
functioning, but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful 
interpersonal relationships.
60 Moderate symptoms OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school 
functioning.
50 Serious symptoms OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or 
school functioning.
40 Some impairment in reality testing or communication OR major impairment 
in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, 
thinking, or mood.
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30 Behavior is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations OR 
serious impairment, in communication or judgment OR inability to 
function in almost all areas.
20 Some danger of hurting self or others OR occasionally fails to maintain 
minimal personal hygiene OR gross impairment in communication.
10 Persistent danger of severely hurting self or others OR persistent inability to 
maintain minimal personal hygiene OR serious suicidal act with clear 
expectation of death.
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Appendix K 
Nature Argument
However, in the past few years striking evidence has mounted in favor of the 
biological causation of mental disorders. For instances, genetic researchers have 
demonstrated that genes play a role in making people vulnerable to most mental 
disorders - e.g. mental disorders run strongly in families - and have located these 
genes on certain chromosomes. In addition, new technologies such as MRI and 
PET scans have allowed medical researchers to prove that people who suffer from 
mental disorders have abnormal levels of neurochemicals in their brains and/or 
structural abnormalities. These abnormalities disrupt the person's ability to 
overcome life stresses, so that their emotions and behaviors can no longer be 
controlled. Diagnostic categories can now be validated against these genetic and 
brain-based findings so that it has been demonstrated unequivocally that 
diagnostic categories are indicators of underlying brain-based disorders.
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Appendix L 
Nurture Argument
Yet, many years of clinical study and research have convinced most psychologists 
that mental disorders are largely the result of painful and difficult life experiences, 
and that few if any of these disorders can be understood solely as genetic and 
biological problems
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Table 2
Structure Matrix Rotated to the Oblimin Criterion for Genetic Attribution (N =
394)
Mental Disorder Factor 1 Factor 2 h2
Alcohol Dependence .188 .700 .491
Anorexia Nervosa .207 .742 .551
Bipolar I Disorder .775 .034 .623
Dysthymic Disorder .488 .562 .451
Major Depressive Disorder .585 .437 .439
Paranoid Schizophrenia .719 .086 .523
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder -.003 .608 .392
Schizotypal Personality .611 .205 .377
Eigenvalues 2.513 1.335
% of variance 31.4 16.7
Note: Coefficients greater than .40 are bolded and retained for that factor. 
Percentage variance is postrotation. The eigenvalue of the third, unretained factor 
is .836. h = communality coefficient.
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Table 3
Structure Matrix Rotated to the Oblimin Criterion for Mutability (N = 394)
Mental Disorder Factor 1 Factor 2 h2
Alcohol Dependence .139 .793 .647
Anorexia Nervosa .374 .772 .610
Bipolar I Disorder .709 .250 .503
Dysthymic Disorder .576 .491 .430
Major Depressive Disorder .541 .571 .462
Paranoid Schizophrenia .737 .023 .602
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder .434 .327 .225
Schizotypal Personality .746 .305 .559
Eigenvalues 2.931 1.107
% of variance 36.6 13.8
Note: Coefficients greater than .40 are bolded and retained for that factor. 
Percentage variance is postrotation. The eigenvalue of the third, unretained factor 
is .889. h = communality coefficient.
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Table 4
Structure Matrix Rotated to the Oblimin Criterion for Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment (N = 394)
Mental Disorder Factor 1 Factor 2 h2
Alcohol Dependence .003 .782 .635
Anorexia Nervosa .146 .756 .572
Bipolar I Disorder .719 .046 .526
Dysthymic Disorder .661 .322 .477
Major Depressive Disorder .720 .108 .520
Paranoid Schizophrenia .631 .073 .401
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder .346 .640 .461
Schizotypal Personality .668 .178 .449
Eigenvalues 2.585 1.456
% o f variance 32.3 18.2
Note: Coefficients greater than .40 are bolded and retained for that factor. 
Percentage variance is postrotation. The eigenvalue of the third, unretained factor
■y
is .822. h = communality coefficient.
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Table 5
Structure Matrix Rotated to the Oblimin Criterion for Psychosocial Attribution (N
= 394)
Mental Disorder Factor 1 Factor 2 h2
Alcohol Dependence .113 .769 .594
Anorexia Nervosa .156 .587 .345
Bipolar I Disorder .711 .150 .505
Dysthymic Disorder .590 .258 .365
Major Depressive Disorder .432 .617 .473
Paranoid Schizophrenia .739 .053 .558
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder .051 .641 .419
Schizotypal Personality .715 .137 .511
Eigenvalues 2.372 1.400
% of variance 29.6 17.5
Note: Coefficients greater than .40 are bolded and retained for that factor.
Percentage variance is postrotation. The eigenvalue of the third, unretained factor
2 •  •is .904. h = communality coefficient.
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Table 6
Structure Matrix Rotated to the Oblimin Criterion for Reification (N = 394)
Mental Disorder Factor 1 Factor 2 h2
Alcohol Dependence .078 .718 .537
Anorexia Nervosa .218 .696 .484
Bipolar I Disorder .762 .179 .584
Dysthymic Disorder .532 .436 .366
Major Depressive Disorder .612 .562 .530
Paranoid Schizophrenia .711 .197 .506
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder .300 .680 .472
Schizotypal Personality .711 .134 .514
Eigenvalues 2.771 1.221
% of variance 34.6 15.3
Note: Coefficients greater than .40 are bolded and retained for that factor. 
Percentage variance is postrotation. The eigenvalue of the third, unretained factor 
is .853. h2 = communality coefficient.
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Table 7
Analysis o f  Variance for Main Effects between Mental Disorder Clusters and 
each Clinical Vignette Measure
Measure d f F P n2
Genetic Attribution 2 402.34 <.001 .41
Informativeness 2 5.11 .006 .01
Mutability 2 98.04 <.001 .14
Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment 2 291.95 <.001 .33
Psychosocial Attribution 2 428.15 <.001 .42
Reification 2 220.23 <.001 .27
GAF 2 125.81 <.001 .18
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Table 8
Tukey’s HSD Post-Hoc Homogenous Subsets for Mental Disorder Clusterings 
and Clinical Vignette Measures
Genetic Depressive Psychosocial
Disorders Disorders Disorders
M SD M SD M SD
Genetic Attribution 3.97 .57 3.32 .75 2.60 .71
Mutability 2.53 .63 3.03 .75 3.21 .72
Psychopharmaceutical 3.52 .61 3.38 .74 2.46 .65Treatment
Psychosocial Attribution 3.04 .75 3.88 .63 4.34 .49
Reification 2.29 .69 2.91 .79 3.41 .78
GAF 41.80 10.90 54.34 10.29 44.54 13.55
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Table 9
Analysis o f  Variance for Main Effects between Attribution Model Profiles and
each Clinical Vignette Measure in the Genetic Disorders Cluster
Measure d f F P n2
Genetic Attribution 3 8.52 <.001 .061
Informativeness 3 .90 .44 .007
Mutability 3 4.64 <.01 .034
Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment 3 2.30 <.01 .017
Psychosocial Attribution 3 14.05 <.001 .098
Reification 3 10.96 <.001 .030
GAF 3 3.96 <.001 .18
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Table 10
Analysis o f  Variance for Main Effects between Attribution Model Profiles and
each Clinical Vignette Measure in the Depressive Disorders Cluster
Measure d f F P rj2
Genetic Attribution 3 15.31 <.001 .105
Informativeness 3 5.11 .002 .038
Mutability 3 4.87 .002 .036
Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment 3 4.83 .003 .036
Psychosocial Attribution 3 5.98 <.001 .044
Reification 3 9.32 <.001 .067
GAF 3 3.51 .015 .026
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Table 11
Analysis o f  Variance for Main Effects between Attribution Model Profiles and
each Clinical Vignette Measure in the Psychosocial Disorders Cluster
Measure d f F P v2
Genetic Attribution 3 2.96 .032 .022
Informativeness 3 5.98 .001 .044
Mutability 3 3.53 .015 .026
P sychopharmaceutical 
Treatment 3 1.97 .118 .015
Psychosocial Attribution 3 4.41 .005 .033
Reification 3 .91 .434 .007
GAF 3 .88 .454 .007
Figure Caption
Figure 1. Exploratory factor analysis mental disorder clusterings.
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